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I discuss some problems related to extreme mathematical realism, focusing on a recently
proposed “shut-up-and-calculate” approach to physics [1],[2]. I offer arguments for a moder-
ate alternative, the essence of which lies in the acceptance that mathematics is (at least in
part) a human construction, and discuss concrete consequences of this—at first sight purely
philosophical—difference in point of view.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern-day fundamental physics has become increasingly mathematised, and this approach has
been immensely successful in terms of describing and predicting some aspects of nature. Whether
this implies an equally impressive advance in terms of understanding nature is a more delicate issue.
According to the reductionist model, we understand certain phenomena of nature because we can
describe them in terms of equations, which are justified in turn by ‘more fundamental’ phenomena
of nature, which can again be described by equations, etcetera. Alternatively, one could reject the
reductionist chain based on the idea that, at every level of description and experience, complexity
can emerge which cannot be reduced to the more ‘fundamental’ layer of description.
The question is closely related to the debate between realist and constructivist views on science,
i.e., the question whether the essence of science implies uncovering the elements of external reality
and their relations, or rather constructing a framework whose truth-value is determined in part
by human (for example, social) standards. A crucial argument in favour of scientific realism (the
‘no-miracle’ argument) is that the success of science in describing nature would be miraculous if
scientific theories were not at least approximately true descriptions of nature. Counterarguments
include the underdetermination of theory by experiment, and the ‘pessimistic meta-induction’
argument, namely that the historic fact that even immensely successful theories such as Newtonian
gravity have been abandoned as candidates for ‘true descriptions’ of nature leads one to expect
2that our current best theories will eventually suffer the same fate.
A view on science which combines a rather extreme form of scientific realism with an equally
radical form of reductionism, is the idea to look for a most fundamental mathematical structure
that ‘explains’ it all, a ‘Theory of Everything’ (ToE). Such a view could be dubbed ‘extreme
mathematical realism’, since the essence of the structure of external reality is assumed to be
mathematical,1 and is arguably prevalent (at least implicitly) in a significant part of the high-
energy physics community (see [6] for an illustrative example, [7] for some relevant case studies).
A very interesting explicit formulation and defence of extreme mathematical realism was recently
presented by Tegmark [1],[2]. I wish here to discuss some aspects of extreme mathematical realism,
and of Tegmark’s proposal in particular, and point out what seem to me to be several problematic
issues at the foundations of it. Far from swinging to the other, constructivist extreme (which, most
scientists will agree, is clearly contradicted by the impressive success of science, and of mathematics’
role in it [8]), I will advocate for an intermediate position. This consists essentially in the (mildly
anti-Platonic) acceptance that mathematics is, at least in part, a human construction, without
denying that its impressive success in science indicates that there is more to the relation between
mathematics and reality than merely the fact that we use the former to describe the latter. I by
no means claim this to be an original or very well-defined proposal, although I will try to stress
points that are generally largely overlooked, for example the fact that whether or not mathematics
is a human construction is (at least partially) an empirical question. Finally, I will point out that
this—at first sight purely philosophical—argument has concrete consequences in the search for a
possible Theory of Everything (although obviously ‘ToE’ is a very badly chosen term once one
agrees to dismiss extreme mathematical realism).
II. SOME PROBLEMS OF EXTREME MATHEMATICAL REALISM
Tegmark’s proposal for extreme mathematical realism can be summarised as follows. He starts
with the External Reality Hypothesis, or ERH, namely the hypothesis that “there exists an external
1 Mathematical realism in its plain form states that mathematical concepts exist independently of the human mind.
When combined with the radically reductionist view that all elements of reality can be reduced to mathematical
entities or structures, one arrives at what I here call ‘extreme mathematical realism’, which is a form of what is
known as ‘(radical) ontic structural realism’ in the contemporary philosophical literature. I should stress that it is
an issue of debate whether radical ontic structural realism necessarily reduces to a mathematical form of structural
realism or not, and some authors hace criticised it precisely based on the argument that it does. See [3] for ontic
structural realism and how it could clarify identity and discernibility issues in quantum physics, [4] for the critical
argument that ontic structural realism implies mathematical reductionism and hence fails to account for physical
entities, and [5] for a reply to this criticism.
3physical reality completely independent of us humans”. Second, he formulates the Mathematical
Universe Hypothesis, or MUH, which states that “our external physical reality is a mathematical
structure,” in other words that reality is really “all just equations”. Tegmark argues that the MUH
is actually a consequence of taking the ERH seriously, and therefore that to achieve a complete
and objective description of reality, it must be formulated in a language completely independent
of “human baggage”: pure mathematics, without any reference to observed properties of physi-
cal objects. Moreover, according to Tegmark, this point of view makes (at least) two “testable
predictions”, namely that plenty of further mathematical regularities remain to be discovered in
nature, and that parallel universes should exist in what Tegmark calls the “multiverse level IV”
sense, namely that to every possible substructure of the mathematical superstructure which defines
objective reality, there should correspond the physical existence of a universe.
A. The External Reality Hypothesis
The question of the existence of an external reality has been a recurring theme in the history of
philosophy. Two influential 20th-century examples are the following. In the philosophical current
known as Phenomenology (see, e.g., [9], [10] and [11]), it was held that whenever we talk about
an ‘objective reality’, we conceive it in a way essentially rooted in the perception that we, human
conscious observers, have of it. For example, blue is not the wavelength of a light ray at a frequency
of 450 nm, it is our perception of such light. The frequency of such a light ray is not an intrinsic
property of it, but rather of the way we measure and describe it. Even its being a light ray is
arguably not an intrinsic property of the light ray, but of our understanding of it. For example,
a speculative non-human observer might categorise light rays as such based on their observational
properties, not on any intrinsic non-observable property that essentially defines all light rays. In
this phenomenological view, the claim that there exists an external reality actually independent
of us humans is only meaningful inasmuch as the exclusion of human presence does not imply the
exclusion of the possibility of conscious observation. On the other hand, Wittgenstein [12] defended
the view that it is impossible to give conclusive rational arguments for the objective existence of
an external reality, but that it is nevertheless an essential presupposition or background for any
acquisition of knowledge, and hence for any serious philosophical or scientific debate.
The contemporary view can be seen as a combination of these two: While it is hard to define the
precise meaning of (the existence of) external reality, generally speaking, its use is perfectly fine.
Indeed, it is in general not necessary for there to be an actual observation to be able to speak of an
4observable, only potential observation is necessary. So, although the epistemological status of such
an argument remains a bit questionable when literally expanded to reality as a whole (how should
potential observation of an objective reality independent of conscious observers be interpreted?), it
seems fine as a working hypothesis for science. Nevertheless, it might be wise to interpret a logical
reasoning which is profoundly based on it, in particular: ‘if ERH and MUH, then mathematical
universe’, with care.
In any case, it is indeed clearly not too controversial that there is something out there which
“can be kicked, and can kick back” [13]. But it must be emphasised that in this sense, the claim of
the existence of an external reality relates to an observable physical reality (even when abstraction
is made of any actual observation), to what one could call the Aristotelian reality of the senses, as
opposed to the Platonic world of perfect triangles and other ideal (mathematical or metaphysical)
concepts. In the opposite case, that is: if the ERH concerns the Platonic world, then the claim of
its objective existence independent of us humans would certainly be far more problematic, and the
whole argument for mathematical realism would be rather question-begging.
B. The Mathematical Universe Hypothesis
The second element of mathematical realism is what Tegmark calls the MUH or ‘Mathematical
Universe Hypothesis’: the idea that our external physical reality is a mathematical structure. I
will sketch three arguments against this hypothesis.
First, there is a possible confusion between what I have just called the Aristotelian observable
world, and the Platonic world of (mathematical or metaphysical) ideas and concepts. The argument
that the mathematical structure is the essential or fundamental one, and the implication that the
observational content of the physical world is part of the baggage which should be thrown out to
arrive at a Theory of Everything, seems to lead to a contradiction with the original ERH, since—as
I argued above—the latter vindicated precisely the existence of an objective external physical and
hence observable world, not of a mathematical one. Classical Platonism avoids this pitfall precisely
by denying the objective existence of the observable world from the start, and calling it an illusion.
Tegmark’s way out of the contradiction is by arguing that the observational content “emerges”
from the mathematical structure by a strictly mathematical analysis of the structure itself. This
leads me to the second point of critique.
The second point is the question of how mathematical equations could arrive at meaning when
human baggage is excluded. Tegmark argues that a purely mathematical investigation of the
5mathematical equation or structure can lead to the emergence of familiar physical notions and
interpretation, and offers a possible first move in this direction,2 which places a heavy emphasis
on the analysis of symmetries. The question is whether this could ever be sufficient to arrive at
meaning, in the sense of “human baggage” or physically observable properties. An illustrative
example is the following. In classical mechanics, all Hamiltonian systems with a single degree of
freedom, with bounded trajectories and no explicit time-dependence, are integrable and mathe-
matically equivalent, in the following sense. One can always define a canonical transformation such
that these systems are described by exactly the same trajectories in the phase space of these new
variables Q and P . For example, using the Hamilton-Jacobi method, one can write H = P and
obtain Q = t+Q0. This results in circular trajectories run through at a constant angular velocity,
with the same conserved quantities of motion P and Q0 for all such systems. In particular, the
difference between a harmonic and an anharmonic oscillator then depends solely on the choice
of a ‘physical’ coordinate system, since in terms of the canonical coordinates Q and P , they are
mathematically identical.3 In other words, one and the same mathematical description results in
two very different physical objects: a harmonic or an anharmonic oscillator, depending on the
coordinate system that is chosen or imposed by the physical context. So the physical content of
the object is in this simple example clearly not exhausted by its purely mathematical description.
The third point is the following. Tegmark argues that, if we want to give a complete description
of reality, then we will need a language independent of us humans, understandable for non-human
sentient entities, such as aliens and future supercomputers. However, it is not clear why we should
recur to aliens or supercomputers. We know many non-human entities, plenty of which are quite
intelligent, and many of which can apprehend, memorise, compare and even approximately add nu-
merical quantities [15]. Several animals have also passed the mirror test of self-consciousness. But
a few surprising examples of mathematical abstraction notwithstanding (for example, chimpanzees
can be trained to carry out symbolic addition with digits [15], or the report [16] of a parrot under-
standing a “zero-like concept”), all examples of animal intelligence with respect to mathematics
are limited to basic counting abilities. The point is that the question of whether mathematics is
2 An interesting second move to derive “physics from scratch” is suggested in [14].
3 One could of course also define alternative sets of canonical coordinates in which the difference between a harmonic
and an anharmonic oscillator is preserved, but this is rather trivial. The non-trivial fact is that a set of coordinates
can be found in which an exhaustive mathematical solution (i.e., one accounting for all degrees of freedom) provides
no way to discriminate between them. That this is not trivial is easy to see when one realizes that for two-(or
higher-)dimensional oscillators, it is in general impossible to find such a coordinate transformation between a
harmonic and an anharmonic oscillator, i.e., the distinction between the two is then intrinsic at the mathematical
level and is independent of the actual choice of a physical coordinate system.
6really an observer-independent language is in part an empirical question, not just a question of
principle. This point is largely ignored by the contemporary philosophical discussion about the sta-
tus of mathematical entities, which focuses mainly on epistemological and ontological arguments
as to whether mathematical entities should be taken to really exist (as abstract, and therefore
non-spatiotemporal objects, completely independent of us and our minds), as in the Platonic view,
or to be, for example, useful but nevertheless ‘fictional’ generalisations of certain properties of
concrete physical entities.4 To settle the empirical question about the observer-independence of
mathematical objects in the affirmative, non-human intelligent beings should exist that understand
the language of advanced mathematics. However, none of the non-human intelligent beings that
we know of confirm the status of (advanced) mathematics as an objective language. So maybe it
is more reasonable to accept that mathematics is at least in part a human construction. Possibly,
in Kronecker’s words [19], “the natural numbers come from God, everything else is man’s work”.
From this point of view, the reality that we humans describe in mathematical terms is not an
external reality independent of us humans, but rather an abstract entity which is defined (at least
in part) by us, humans.
III. A MODERATE ALTERNATIVE AND ITS CONSEQUENCE
The alternative to the extreme mathematical realism defended by Tegmark simply consists, as
I just indicated, in the acceptance that mathematics is at least in part a human construct. An
interesting side-question is whether such a general point of view can have any concrete conse-
quence. The answer is affirmative, at least in the sense of denying (part of) the concrete “testable
consequences” of the extreme mathematical realism defended by Tegmark.
First of all, I should emphasise that mathematics is ‘at least in part’ a human construct. Indeed,
4 There exists a whole array of possible positions with regard to the status of mathematical objects, see [17] for a
survey. The following example might be useful to illustrate the main contemporary arguments. ‘3’ can be taken
to either truly exist as an abstract entity, as in the Platonic view, or it can be taken to be merely a useful term
for describing particular concrete sets of concrete physical entities, without implying the existence of the abstract
entity ’3’. In this latter view, ‘3’ could then for example be considered as a fictional concept much in the same
sense as, say, Sherlock Holmes. An important argument in favour of the existence of abstract objects (and hence
in favour of Platonism), known as the ‘singular term argument’, is essentially the following. It seems evident that
the sentence ’3 is prime’ is true. However, in the traditional interpretation of truth, accepting sentences of the type
‘a is P ’ as true implies a commitment to the existence of a referent for a. Russell’s famous example ‘The present
king of France is bald’ should therefore be considered as false [18]. This argument seems to imply that accepting
the truth of ‘3 is prime’ requires accepting the existence of the abstract entity ‘3’. The main argument against
Platonism—apart from Occam’s razor, see below—is currently held to be the epistemological argument that it is
questionable that we, as concrete spatiotemporal beings, could arrive at knowledge of mathematical objects if the
latter were truly abstract non-spatiotemporal entities and therefore causally disconnected from us.
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as it is to claim that mathematics is the true and pure language of reality. Therefore, my con-
tention about mathematics and its (partially) human origin should not be understood in the sense
of intuitionism or constructivism (which claim that mathematical entities are essentially mental
constructions), but simply as a rejection of Platonism, at least in its traditional formulation.5 A
classical argument against Platonism is that it unnecessarily complicates our view of reality by
requiring a commitment to the existence of an immense realm of mathematical and other abstract
entities, thereby violating Occam’s razor. This does not imply a denial of the effectiveness of math-
ematics at describing (part of) reality. But the reason for this effectiveness might well lie simply in
the fact that mathematics is a very flexible tool, an abstract descriptive language which—precisely
because it is abstract—can be applied to a huge variety of different concrete situations.
Let me now discuss consequences of this view. Tegmark predicts the existence of plenty of
further mathematical regularities to be discovered in nature, and the existence of a “level IV”
multiverse. The first prediction would also be the case if mathematics is interpreted simply as an
abstract descriptive language, provided that it is sufficiently flexible to describe a wide variety of
concrete situations. Since ‘old’ mathematics (differential equations, for example) are constantly
being applied and used to describe ‘new’ situations or applications (in economic or demographic
models, for example, where it seems hardly contentious that the use of mathematics is descriptive
and not fundamental), this is clearly the case. Second, in the line of the first argument against
the MUH (see section IIB) on the confusion between mathematical and physical existence, the
fact that many mathematical structures might exist, either totally separate or as substructures
of one unique mathematical superstructure, does not necessarily imply the physical existence of a
multiverse.
Apart from rejecting these two predictions of extreme mathematical realism, there is a third
consequence of accepting that mathematics is a descriptive and partly human language. In extreme
mathematical realism, the ultimate unifying physical theory must necessarily be the unique math-
ematical superstructure, since reality is precisely this mathematical superstructure. If one rejects
mathematical realism, then there are two possibilities. The pessimistic possibility is that mathe-
matics is not flexible enough, or our use of it not imaginative enough, to describe scientific reality
at the fundamental level of time, space and matter in a single comprehensive framework. Then we
5 In [20], the thesis is defended that the question of whether mathematical entities really exist is not only irrelevant
for mathematical practise, but even for Platonism, when this is understood in a deflationary or moderate sense.
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should be capable of describing any sort of (existing or non-existing) universe or multiverse, for
many of which it might be hard to imagine any meaning in human or physical terms, in spite of their
mathematical consistency. The selection of which theory is the correct ToE should then be based
not only on a criterion of mathematical consistency, but at least also on additional experimental
input. And even that might not be sufficient. At the level of quantum gravity, the lack of any
direct experimental input might make underdetermination of theory by experiment [21] an acute
problem, since the further an experiment is from our everyday reality (for example, due to the
extremely high energies involved), the further the involved concepts are from directly identifiable
physical observables. There might then be several, maybe even countless, abstract mathematical
structures which, in the proper limit and with the proper interpretation, give rise to time, space
and matter as we know it. In that case, in the end maybe criteria of elegance and other human
preferences might come into play to determine the ‘correct’ ToE.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
I have discussed a few arguments against extreme mathematical realism, focusing on the formu-
lation recently given by Tegmark [1],[2]. First, I pointed out a possible logical problem in identifying
physical and mathematical existence. Second, I gave a simple example showing that physically ob-
servable properties cannot always be deduced from mathematical properties. Third, I emphasised
that the available empirical evidence reinforces the anti-Platonic position that mathematics is, at
least in part, a human construction. While none of these arguments is conclusive in itself, they
illustrate that extreme mathematical realism implies a radical and therefore tense position (and
possibly even an internal contradiction) in several long-standing philosophical debates. Finally, I
have argued that rejecting extreme mathematical realism has concrete consequences in the search
for a Theory of Everything, namely that there is no reason to expect mathematical consistency,
or the search for a mathematical superstructure, to lead to a single—and therefore necessarily
correct—Theory of Everything.
These arguments can be related to the general problems of “radical ontic structural realism,” the
contemporary name for the philosophical current to which extreme mathematical realism belongs.
Radical ontic structural realism is basically the idea that only structure in the sense of relations is
real, and denies the reality of the objects or relata that instantiate these relations in the physical
world. The basic problem [22] with such a radical view is that concrete, physical relations cannot
9exist without relata. A moderate form of structural realism would therefore accept that physical
relations require relata, i.e., that the realisation of abstract mathematical structures requires real
physical objects to instantiate them, while it could still defend that the intrinsic properties of these
objects are exhaustively described by the structural relations between the objects. However, it
is essential to understand that this does not reduce the concrete existence of such objects to the
abstract existence of the relations: it does not imply that all possible (mathematical) relations
are actually (physically) instantiated, a point related to my first argument. Thinking of the relata
as the concrete objects that we encounter from experience or observation, and their relations as
structures described by human-independent abstract mathematics, is a serious oversimplification,
as illustrated by my third argument. Nevertheless, the essential point is that science cannot do
without either of the two, and that neither of them can fully be reduced to the other, as I illustrated
in my second argument. From this point of view, identifying physical and mathematical existence
is an ontological category mistake, or at least a contentious metaphysical position. The same is
therefore true for the prediction of a multiverse. To interpret this prediction as a prediction about
physical existence requires not only a (mathematical) theory which predicts the (mathematical)
existence of multiple structures, but also metaphysical premises of radical realism and reduction-
ism. The other prediction of extreme mathematical realism, that plenty of further mathematical
regularity remains to be discovered in nature, can just as easily be accomodated in the view that
mathematics is an abstract descriptive language.
This brings us back to an issue that I have mentioned in the introduction, namely the argument
between reductionism and emergence. Extreme mathematical realism comprises a defence of reduc-
tionism driven to its most radical consequences.6 As Tegmark correctly insists upon, symmetries
have played a paradigmatic role in contemporary physics. However, this is true both on the re-
ductionist front and in the study of emergent phenomena. Moreover, it is not only the symmetries
themselves that determine our physical experience of reality, but also the way in which they are
broken (as already insisted upon in Anderson’s famous paper [23]) and/or formed. It is for example
widely expected that the Brout-Englert-Higgs mechanism of ‘spontaneous’ symmetry breaking is
responsible for mass acquisition by the particles of the standard model when the energy decreased
below a certain threshold. On the other hand, from the study of low temperature physics, we know
that not only symmetry-breaking occurs when decreasing the energy, but that new symmetries
6 For the sake of clarity, I should insist that this is not necessarily the case for (moderate versions of) scientific realism
and reductionism in general. Scientific realism does not necessarily entail reductionism, nor does reductionism
necessarily imply scientific realism.
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can also emerge in that same process of energy decrease. Actually, there are several examples, for
instance of condensed matter systems, where Lorentz symmetry emerges as an effective low-energy
symmetry [24], and there are speculations (although no experimental evidence as yet) that this
might also be the case for our spacetime as a whole [25]. It might then well be that the symmetries
which we observe are a contingent result of the energy window in which we live, and all the physics
that we deal with might be limited by the upper and lower cut-off scales at which the ‘fundamental’
symmetries that we experience emerge and are broken. It would then be impossible to derive the
full mathematical bird’s point of view for our universe from our frog’s point of view. In any case,
since we have currently only approximately understood less than 5% of the total energy content
of our observable universe, there remains a lot of work to be done both on the reductionist and
on the emergent front. But in the meantime, it might be well to keep an eye open on both. To
end with Einstein’s words [26]: “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not
certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality.”
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